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Alien Terrorists: Public 
Discourse on 9/11 and the 
American Science Fiction Film 
 
 
Michael C. Frank 
 
I 
At the beginning of October 2001, a little less than a month after the terrorist 
attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, the news broke that ‘government 
intelligence specialists ha[d] been secretly soliciting terrorist scenarios from top 
Hollywood filmmakers and writers’ (Brodesser 2001). In several meetings held at 
the University of South California Institute for Creative Technology – a research 
institute founded in 1999 to develop virtual environment training software for US 
soldiers – army officials sought the imaginative expertise of a varied group of 
people, none of whom had any specialised knowledge of either Middle Eastern 
history or the strategies and ideologies of Islamist terrorism. Among the partici-
pants were screenwriter Steven E. de Souza, of Die Hard fame, as well as B-movie 
director Joseph Zito, whose works include the Chuck Norris vehicle Invasion 
U.S.A. According to a brief report published by Variety, the official aim of the 
meetings, which involved teleconferences with the Pentagon, was ‘to brainstorm 
about possible terrorist targets and schemes in America and to offer solutions to 
those threats’ (Brodesser 2001). 
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On one level, the US government’s recourse to the creative powers of Hol-
lywood constitutes a particularly striking example of what social anthropologist 
Joseba Zulaika has described as the ‘crisis of knowledge’ (2009: 2) in counterter-
rorism. For Zulaika, the shortcomings of counterterrorism stem from the self-
referentiality of its discourse, which is predicated on a ‘faulty epistemology – be-
ginning with the placement of the entire phenomenon [of terrorism] in a context 
of taboo and the willful ignorance of the political subjectivities of the terrorists’ 
(2009: 2; see also Zulaika and Douglass 1996). From such a perspective, the deci-
sion to generate possible threat scenarios with the help of members of the film 
entertainment industry may be taken to indicate a reluctance to engage with the 
real circumstances of terrorism – the political, cultural, and ideological factors that 
constitute the root of the problem. At any rate, the secret meetings at USC illus-
trate the point made by sociologist Frank Furedi that after 11 September 2001, 
‘[i]magining evil [was] presented as the medium through which understanding of 
the terrorist threat may be gained’ (2007: xxvi). Citing the 9/11 Commission Report 
as the most salient example, Furedi demonstrates that the limitations of counter-
terrorist intelligence were frequently described ‘as a problem of imagination rather 
than of information’ (2007: xxiv). Consequently, imaginative speculation soon 
became an official means of complementing – and, if necessary, substituting for – 
observation and analysis, making the line between fact and fiction increasingly 
difficult to draw. 
Read at another level, the idea of tapping into the creativity of screenwriters 
and directors seems like a logical consequence of the common notion that the 
attacks themselves appeared to have sprung from Hollywood films. Statements to 
the effect that the events in New York had seemed ‘like a movie’ may be found in 
countless eyewitness accounts, and the cinematic analogy was immediately taken 
up by journalists, writers, and scholars. Always quick off the mark, Slovenian phi-
losopher Slavoj Žižek and French sociologist Jean Baudrillard were among the 
first internationally renowned theorists to bring their particular approaches to bear 
on the events of 9/11. As different as their essays were, they both addressed the 
resemblances between the New York disaster and earlier fictional movie scenarios 
in an attempt to explain the ‘jouissance’ (Žižek 2002: 12) afforded by the images of 
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the collapsing Twin Towers.1 Despite their different emphases and conclusions, 
these and many other commentaries have at least one thing in common: they are 
based on the unquestioned assumption that the (real) happenings of 11 September 
were so similar to (fictional) filmic images that this uncanny correspondence must 
be considered one of the essential characteristics of the event. 
This chapter asks how and for what reasons Hollywood movies have so 
persistently served as a frame of reference for representations of 9/11. In doing 
so, it does not seek to provide another confirmation of the common understand-
ing that 9/11 has had an inherently – and disturbingly – cinematic quality. On the 
contrary, it starts from the assumption that the Hollywood analogy is not as self-
evident as may be supposed at first sight. Bernd Scheffer reminds us that ‘al-
though seeming identities, or at least striking similarities between Hollywood 
movies and real events in the USA ... do exist, a closer look will reveal no real and 
especially no complete agreement, only some misleading, albeit frequent, superfi-
cial likenesses’ (2003). While Scheffer mainly thinks of differences in content, 
formal discrepancies are just as significant. Geoff King persuasively argues that 
the images shown in the early phases of the 11 September broadcast news cover-
age contained several ‘modality markers’ that clearly framed them as a ‘“breaking” 
live news event’ (2005: 49), most importantly, the quality and quantity of the avail-
able images. The cinematic analogy, then, was not simply ‘there’. Rather, it was the 
result of a particular perception of the event. While spontaneous references to 
Hollywood movies among witnesses on the scene of the disaster are one thing, 
the perpetuation of the cinematic analogy in the weeks, months, and years after 
the event is quite another. As I shall argue, it may best be understood with refer-
ence to a larger discourse, which is responsible for a specific conception of the 
attacks, their perpetrators, and Islamist terrorism in general, a conception to 
which the consideration of 9/11 through the prism of Western mainstream cin-
ema has contributed its share. 
The following discussion is indebted to the field of Critical Terrorism Stud-
ies inaugurated by political scientist Richard Jackson (Jackson 2005; Jackson, 
Smith and Grunning 2009). In his 2005 study Writing the War on Terrorism, Jackson 
reads post-9/11 statements by members of the Bush administration as part of a 
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political narrative created to generate public support for an unprecedented coun-
terterrorist campaign – both at home (the USA Patriot Act and its incursions into 
civil rights) and abroad (the various battlefields of the war on terrorism). Such 
measures, Jackson argues, require a large degree of consensus. The war on terror-
ism, therefore, had to be normalised – something that the discourse implemented 
by the Bush administration achieved to great effect. According to Jackson, the 
most important features of this discourse are the interpretation of the terrorist 
attacks as an ‘act of war’ necessitating a military response, the legitimisation of this 
response as a battle between good versus evil (and, hence, a just war), as well as 
the ensuing demonisation and dehumanisation of the enemy. Jackson also empha-
sises the exaggeration of the threat of terrorism and the idea of an entirely new 
kind of war, to which old rules no longer apply. This war, one may add, is repre-
sented not as a clash of civilisations (in the plural), but as a clash between civilisa-
tion (in the singular) and anti-civilisation, a global conflict in which people of all 
freedom-loving nations stand together against those who have perverted their 
faith out of sheer hatred for Western democratic values and ways of life. Excluded 
from this dominant narrative are explanations implicating American foreign pol-
icy, an effect reinforced by the positioning of 9/11 as a radical rupture (see Jarvis 
2008), which separates the event from its roots in earlier political conflicts and 
thus entails a de-historicisation. 
Against this backdrop, the following discussion will focus on the role of one 
particular film genre in the representation of 9/11: science fiction. When wit-
nesses on the scene of the attacks in Manhattan stated that the event had seemed 
‘like a movie’, Roland Emmerich’s Independence Day was among the most fre-
quently mentioned films. The perceived analogy between the incidents of 9/11 
and the alien invasion genre not only concerned the affected targets – American 
landmark buildings – but also the perpetrators, whose ‘alienness’ was greatly em-
phasised by the Bush administration. Considering the discourse-historical trajec-
tory of the ‘alien terrorist’ metaphor, it seems significant that one of the first high-
budget Hollywood productions that was explicitly marketed as a post-9/11 film 
chose the alien invasion genre to reflect the anxieties of present-day America: 
before the release of War of the Worlds (2005), Steven Spielberg and his screenwrit-
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ers repeatedly underlined that their adaptation of H.G. Wells’s novel was a delib-
erate evocation of the New York City attacks. Taking this kind of allegorisation 
for granted entails the risk of ignoring the significant political implications in-
volved in such a representation of the event. It is these implications that the pre-
sent chapter will attempt to demonstrate. 
 
II 
‘The building began to disintegrate’, Wall Street analyst Ron Insana reported one 
hour after having seen the south tower of the World Trade Center collapse, his 
clothes still covered in dust: ‘And we heard it and looked up and started to see 
elements of the building coming down and we ran. And honestly, it was like a 
scene out of Independence Day’ (quoted in Monahan 2010: 60). CNBC financial ex-
pert Insana was only one of numerous witnesses on the scene of the 11 Septem-
ber 2001 attacks who drew on disaster and science fiction movies to describe their 
impressions. References to such blockbusters were so remarkably frequent that 
they almost immediately prompted responses from critics, scholars, and members 
of the film business. 
Among the issues addressed by the earliest discussions of the phenomenon 
was the question of how it was possible that the worst terrorist incident in history 
had elicited so many references to shallow entertainments, even among people 
who had followed events in ‘unmediated’ form (that is, unframed by television 
screens and unaccompanied by movie poster-like captions such as ‘America Un-
der Attack’)? New York Times writer Michiko Kakutani was one of the first com-
mentators to attempt an explanation. In an article published on 13 September, she 
argued that the recourse to cinema offered a means of coping with an otherwise 
incomprehensible occurrence: ‘It may seem trivializing – even obscene – to talk 
about movies in the same breath as this week’s tragedy, but the fact that so many 
people did was a symptom of our inability to get our minds around this disaster, 
our inability to find real-life precedents, real-life analogies for what happened in 
the morning hours of Sept. 11’ (2001). According to this line of argument, Holly-
wood’s rich repertoire of images provided a readily accessible frame of reference 
to process and to communicate an experience for which no analogy existed in the 
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historical memory of the American nation. ‘Is this method of pop cultural com-
pensation a bad thing?’ cultural critic Bernie Heidkamp asked himself on the day 
of the event; and he replied with another rhetorical question: ‘Is there any other 
way for us to begin to grasp – or describe – the enormity of the attacks? Ours is, 
after all, a country that has not been damaged, in our lifetime, by war or natural 
catastrophe on the level we are now witnessing’ (2001). 
While this suggests a successful assimilation of the event, a coming to terms 
with it by finding terms for it, other commentators emphasised that references to 
Hollywood films were often accompanied by expressions of disbelief. Among the 
witnesses who made statements to this effect was an unidentified woman in New 
York: ‘This is very surreal. Well, it’s out of a bad sci-fi film, but every morning we 
wake up and you’re like it wasn’t a dream. It actually happened’ (quoted in Nacos 
2002: 35). For Richard Jackson, such statements testify to a ‘deep confusion and a 
genuine sense of epistemic anxiety’, caused by ‘the blurring of the lines between 
the virtual and the real world’ (2005: 30). This would contradict the more optimis-
tic approach according to which cinematic analogies gave shocked and bewildered 
witnesses cognitive support (and, hence, relief), suggesting instead that the per-
ceived correspondences were an essential part of the horror of the situation. If this 
is correct, then the uncanny effects were certainly increased by the fact that, of all 
cinematic forms, it was the most outrageous science fiction that came closest to 
the reality of 9/11. 
In 1996, gigantic saucer-shaped spacecraft hovering above American land-
mark buildings signalled the return of the alien invader to the cinema screen. De-
spite its stereotypical characterisation, questionable plot turns, and undisguised 
jingoism, Roland Emmerich’s heavily marketed Independence Day became the high-
est-grossing film of the year. Strongly derivative in nature, it uses elements of sev-
eral classic B-movies. From the George Pal-produced The War of the Worlds (1953), 
it borrows the device (originating in Wells’s novel) of making the otherwise invin-
cible invaders susceptible to infection – though in this case, it is a computer virus 
rather than bacteria that vanquishes the aliens. Even more notable is a reference 
to a lesser-known classic of the alien-invasion genre, Fred F. Sears’s Earth vs. the 
Flying Saucers (1956). During that film’s climactic battle scene – graced by Ray Har-
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ryhausen’s pioneering stop-motion animation – the aliens fire their ray guns and 
crash their saucers into several symbols of democracy in Washington, DC, includ-
ing the Capitol dome. Independence Day transformed this groundbreaking sequence 
into the simultaneous attack on three American cities, each time beginning with 
the destruction of one iconic edifice. The explosion of the White House in par-
ticular has left a lasting imprint on the cinematic memory, not least because it was 
featured in the film’s famous teaser trailer, first shown – to great effect – during 
the Superbowl. 
Independence Day was the first in a whole series of science fiction films that 
combined 1950s plot elements with post-Jurassic Park digital wonders: Deep Impact, 
Godzilla, and Armageddon, all of which premiered in 1998, equally borrowed their 
premises from 1950s models, using updated versions of familiar plots as vehicles 
for state-of-the-art special effects. The close of the twentieth century thus saw the 
revival of three seemingly obsolete science fiction subgenres, which had previ-
ously been linked by film historians to specific Cold War interests and concerns: 
the alien invasion film, the monster movie (or creature feature), and the end-of-
the-world picture. All three share a strong emphasis on the theme of urban disas-
ter. In what remains one of the most perceptive studies of the topic, Susan Sontag 
recognised as early as 1961 that ‘the science fiction film ... is concerned with the 
aesthetics of destruction, with the peculiar beauties to be found in wreaking 
havoc, making a mess’ (1967: 213). The late-1990s representatives of the genre 
renewed and reinforced that motif, showing a conspicuous preference for down-
town New York and its iconic structures. Again and again, the Empire State 
Building, the Chrysler building, and the towers of the World Trade Center were 
either severely damaged or completely demolished, burying streets, cars, and peo-
ple beneath them. In a tacit competition among studios over the most jaw-
dropping devastation scene, every film attempted to outdo its predecessors in the 
sheer magnitude of the destruction displayed – and in the technological sophisti-
cation of its visual effects. 
If the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon put a – 
temporary – end to this competition, they did so by apparently following a very 
similar logic of outbidding. As film critic Neal Gabler wrote a few days after 9/11: 
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In a sense, this was the terrorists’ own real-life disaster movie – bigger than 
‘Independence Day’ or ‘Godzilla’ or ‘Armageddon’, and in the bizarre com-
petition among terrorists, bigger even than Timothy J. McVeigh’s own real-
life horror film in Oklahoma City, heretofore the standard. You have to be-
lieve at some level it was their rebuff to Hollywood as well as their triumph 
over it – they could out-Hollywood Hollywood. 
(2001) 
 
Three years previously, Gabler had set out to demonstrate in Life: The Movie ‘how 
entertainment conquered reality’, putting forth the thesis that Americans increas-
ingly perceive and fashion the world according to the familiar patterns of movie 
entertainment (1998). His own statement on the 11 September attacks could be 
taken as an illustration of this thesis: while viewing the event through the lens of 
Hollywood ‘entertainment’, Gabler does not consider the possibility that there 
may be a more multi-faceted ‘reality’ beyond his necessarily limited vision. Be-
cause they are so obvious to him, he assumes – or rather postulates – that the 
filmic analogies were meticulously planned by the attackers and their co-
conspirators in all their dramatic detail (although the terrible outcome of the plane 
crashes, the unprecedented collapse of two entire skyscrapers, could hardly have 
been foreseen and had not apparently been part of the plan). What Gabler disre-
gards is that all inferences in this matter can only be tentative: film critics who can 
authoritatively discuss cinematic analogies to 9/11 cannot automatically claim 
insight into the minds of those who devised and executed the attacks. 
Interestingly, even authors who are more qualified to make such assertions 
have come to the conclusion that the filmic dimension of 9/11 was deliberately 
achieved. In his February 2002 essay ‘Roots of Terror’, Iranian-German writer 
and Islamic scholar Navid Kermani argues that the ideological basis of the attacks 
drew from various heterogeneous sources, Islamic as well as non-Islamic. He de-
scribes the terrorists’ agenda as ‘a mixture incorporating anti-capitalism, the cult 
of martyrdom, Third World rhetoric, totalitarian ideology and science fiction’. 
Although he only incidentally touches upon the topic, Kermani too conjectures 
that the corresponding ‘tales of science fiction’ were ‘probably familiar to the at-
tackers’ (2002). Following from there, Albrecht Koschorke calls for a ‘political 
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analysis of the images of September 11’, adding that ‘despite all the analyses that 
have been accomplished in the meantime’, such an investigation ‘still has to allow 
itself to be unsettled by the fact that Islamic terror and Hollywood could meet in 
exactly the same symbolic field’ (2005: 96, my translation). One part of this field, 
according to Koschorke, consists of shared traditions of anti-urbanism (2005: 99-
101). It would be too short-sighted, though, to consider the cinematic destruction 
of metropolises only in terms of latent hostility to cities and their lifestyles. For 
such scenes greatly contributed to the symbolic over-determination and fetishisa-
tion of American cityscapes by directing the viewers’ attention again and again to 
particular landmarks of economic and political power. In this sense at least, there 
can be little doubt that there is indeed a connection between Hollywood films and 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. For, as Heidkamp noted on the day of the at-
tacks, ‘it is, in part, the pop cultural representations that have made buildings such 
as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon iconic symbols of America’ (2001). 
 
III 
Significantly, however, the cinematic analogy was not only applied to the targets of 
the attacks and the scene of the disaster, but also to the hijackers themselves, even if 
this latter dimension of the analogy was not always as obvious as the former. As 
David Simpson remarks at the beginning of his study 9/11: The Culture of Com-
memoration, the events of that day ‘looked to many of us ... like the work of agents 
so unfamiliar as to seem almost like aliens’ (2006: 6). It was precisely in this sense 
that the attacks and their perpetrators were represented in official discourse. In 
their early public declarations, President Bush and his administration strongly re-
inforced the impression of ‘alienness’ by emphasising the radical alterity of the 
attackers. Jackson has meticulously reconstructed the various tropes used by gov-
ernment officials to describe the terrorists. As he demonstrates, the opponents in 
the ‘war on terrorism’ were conceived as evil and inhuman barbarians, leading a 
parasitical existence and being driven by an irrational hatred for ‘civilisation’, that 
is, Western democratic freedoms as epitomised by American society (Jackson 
2005). Most relevant for the present discussion, the cinematic analogy soon ex-
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tended to the domain of real politics, both in the construction of the enemy and 
in the political narratives that accompanied the war on terrorism. 
There is general agreement among film historians that American science fic-
tion subgenres such as the alien invasion film ‘became popular entertainment dur-
ing crisis moments’ (Matthews 2007: 3). It is not difficult to establish such a con-
nection for the first boom of the genre in the 1950s: the anti-Communist hysteria 
fuelled by Senator McCarthy’s ‘witch-hunts’ and the omnipresent nuclear threat 
make it plausible to explain early Cold War scenarios of alien invasion with refer-
ence to contemporary fears (see, for example, Biskind 1983: 101-159). In this con-
text, the anthropomorphic alien functioned as an allegorical substitute for real-life 
foes. But how are we to explain the fact that, after a relative absence of more than 
twenty years, the figure of the evil space invader came back just in time for the 
turn of the millennium? In a pre-9/11 study on the topic, Markus Koch considers 
1990s alien invasion films as a response to the fundamentally changed geopolitical 
situation after the end of the Cold War, when political and cultural boundaries 
had to be newly defined and demarcated (2002). Independence Day, he argues, reso-
nated with the vision of a ‘new world order’ – a vision made famous by George 
H.W. Bush on 11 September 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when the 
American president called for all nations of the earth to defend their interest in 
Persian Gulf oil together (Bush 1990). Emmerich’s film takes this vision one step 
further by making Iraqi fighter pilots part of the force assembled to battle the 
aliens. The scene in the Iraqi desert in which British, Israeli, and Iraqi troops await 
American commands presents a new new world order – in which all mankind is 
united against an entirely different type of foe. 
Accordingly, Koschorke suggests that films such as Independence Day have to 
be read as reflections of a ‘political imaginary’, through which America projected 
enemy figures and adjusted itself to a new, yet undefined threat. Emmerich’s film, 
he argues, indicates that ‘long before the [9/11] attacks, this country had been 
preparing itself for a faceless enemy, and that is to say: for a discourse of total 
othering’ (2004: 104, my translation). In a sense, this ‘faceless enemy’ materialised 
on 9/11. The foreignness and alterity of the terrorists and their supporters were 
immediately underlined in political and legal discourse. On 29 October 2001, 
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three days after he had signed into law the USA Patriot Act, President George W. 
Bush directed the establishment of a Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, 
which was to consist of members of various federal agencies and be headed by the 
Attorney General (see US Department of Homeland Security 2001). Two days 
later, Attorney General John Ashcroft informed the American public about his 
Department’s preparations in this matter: ‘[A]s September the 11th vividly illus-
trates’, he declared, ‘aliens also come to our country with the intent to do great 
evil’ (US Department of Justice 2001). While reading Ashcroft’s speech, one can-
not help noticing that, although the phrase used in the title of the task force is 
‘foreign terrorist’, Ashcroft chooses the word ‘alien’ whenever he speaks of for-
eigners who threaten domestic security. The word appears no less than 23 times in 
the short text. 
As legal scholar David Cole has demonstrated in his important book on the 
subject, ‘terrorist alien’ is the latest variation of the legal category of the ‘enemy 
alien’, whose genealogy can be traced to the time of the French Revolution (Cole 
2003). At the outset of the undeclared naval war between the USA and France in 
the years 1798-1800, Federalist-controlled Congress passed a series of four laws 
designed to prevent ‘alien’ radicalism from spreading over to the United States 
and infecting the polity there. The fourth of these laws determined that in cases of 
war, ‘all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or govern-
ment, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, shall be liable to be 
apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies’ – for the sole 
reason of their nationality. Known as the Alien Enemies Act, this law is still in 
effect today (as Chapter 3 of Title 50 of the United States Code). It has repeatedly 
been invoked during wartime, most notoriously during World War Two: after the 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the category of the ‘enemy alien’ was extended to 
encompass all people of Japanese descent, including those who had already been 
naturalised, leading to mass internments of Japanese nationals as well as Japanese-
Americans on purely ethnic grounds (Cole 2003: 91-100). In a parallel develop-
ment, the category of the ‘enemy alien’ was redefined in such a way that it could 
also be applied in peacetime. This practice began after the anarchist bombings of 
1919, during the so-called Palmer Raids, when thousands of suspected ‘alien radi-
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cals’ were arrested and hundreds were deported (Cole 2003: 116-28). Cole men-
tions this and other controversial episodes in American legal history to make the 
point that the double standard implied in laws aimed exclusively at non-citizens is 
inconsistent with – and, indeed, a danger to – America’s fundamental constitu-
tional principles. 
For Cole, the fact that detention and deportation have repeatedly been used 
against ‘enemy aliens’ is related to a long and persistent tradition of American 
nativism (2003: 90). As Richard Jackson emphasises, however, John Ashcroft’s 
scenario of aliens ‘com[ing] to our country with the intent to do great evil’ does 
more than evoke xenophobic responses: it exploits the unavoidable ambiguity of 
the term ‘alien’ (2005: 71). This ambiguity has also been noticed by self-styled 
‘video-remixer’ TV Sheriff, who used it for comic effect in a short clip released on 
YouTube (see TV Sheriff Channel 2006) and later included on the artist’s first 
DVD. Leaving Ashcroft’s statement unchanged, TV Sheriff modified the caption 
to ‘America’s New War: Ashcroft announces new measures against alien space-
people’ and added appropriate illustrations of various extraterrestrials – suppos-
edly showing the different types of ‘aliens’ mentioned by the Attorney General. 
This satirical response seems to corroborate Jackson’s contention that: 
 
American officials cannot use the term ‘alien’ without their listeners recall-
ing – at least at a subconscious level – hundreds of movies, television pro-
grammes, comics, novels and radio broadcasts (such as War of the Worlds) 
where space aliens attacked, invaded or subverted society from within. In a 
society immersed in the movie mythology of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 
Alien, Predator, Independence Day and The X-Files, the meaning of the term 
‘alien terrorist’ oscillates between ‘extra-terrestrial parasite’ and ‘foreign en-
emy’ without any sense of the absurd. 
(2005: 71) 
 
The most important aspect of the political narrativisation of the 11 September 
attacks was their interpretation as acts of war rather than crimes that could be 
prosecuted within the framework of international law. Some film critics have con-
tended that this interpretation was not simply imposed upon the American public 
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by pro-war propaganda (as Jackson seems to suggest), but that there was a general 
disposition to accept the readings offered by Bush, Ashcroft, and other govern-
ment officials. In the words of one critic, it was ‘American blockbuster movies 
[that] laid the groundwork for the public’s response to the event as the beginning 
of war’ (Bell-Metereau 2003: 143-44). This would imply that the interpretation of 
9/11 in terms of conventional warfare followed the logic of an already established 
cinematic analogy – and that the narrative pattern was thus predefined. 
What is certain, in any case, is that the official responses to the attacks rein-
forced the perceived cinematic analogy (whether deliberately or not) and that the 
cinematographic subtext remained an essential part of how the war on terrorism 
was represented. From a discourse analytical perspective, the alien invasion motif 
seems particularly well suited for post-9/11 counterterrorism discourse, and it is 
therefore not surprising that it has been incorporated – in various ways – into the 
different narratives developed to create support for the government’s measures. 
Sontag’s reflections on early Cold War science fiction are once more instructive 
here. ‘Again and again’, she writes in her 1961 essay, ‘one detects [in these films] 
the hunger for a “good war,” which poses no moral problems, admits of no moral 
qualifications’ (1967: 219). In Byron Haskin’s The War of the Worlds (1953), the 
prototypical alien invasion film, America is attacked on its own soil, without 
provocation and without forewarning, by a faceless enemy who wreaks havoc on 
defenceless civilians. Against such an antagonist, all military measures are permis-
sible. The US Army may even drop an ‘A-bomb’, less than ten years after Hi-
roshima. Whereas the genre’s ‘ur-text’, Wells’s Victorian novel The War of the 
Worlds, compared the Martian incursion with the extermination of the native 
Tasmanians (see Wells 2005: 9), casting the aliens as a distorted mirror image of 
European industrial powers in the period of high imperialism, most alien invasion 
films are unequivocal about the absolute otherness of the antagonist. As director 
Paul Verhoeven succinctly phrased it: ‘Alien sci-fi films give us a terrifying enemy 
that’s politically correct. They’re bad. They’re evil. And they’re not even human’ 
(quoted in Corliss 1996). Accordingly, there is no doubt in these films about the 
legitimacy of retaliation. 
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In Independence Day, US President Thomas Whitmore – a former Gulf War 
pilot – initially refuses to resort to the atomic option. He soon realises, however, 
that all attempts at diplomacy fall on deaf ears. Connecting itself to the body of a 
murdered scientist to express itself in human language, a captured alien categori-
cally rejects the President’s peace offer. When asked ‘What is it you want us to 
do?’, it twice replies ‘Die.’ At this point, communication continues in telepathic – 
and hence inaudible – form, as the alien forcefully enters the President’s mind. 
Like the characters in the film, the viewer depends entirely on the reliability of the 
President, who offers the following summary of his insights: 
 
I saw his thoughts. I saw what they’re planning to do. They’re like locusts. 
They’re moving from planet to planet. Their whole civilization. After 
they’ve consumed every natural resource they move on. And we’re next. 
 
Following this epiphanic realisation, the President loses his scruples concerning 
the use of nuclear weapons: ‘Nuke ’em. Let’s nuke the bastards’. On 11 Septem-
ber 2001, it was similarly the President who first claimed insight into the minds of 
the attackers. No declaration of responsibility had been issued, but Bush knew 
exactly what the principal target of the attack had been: the American ‘way of life, 
our very freedom’ (2001a). When enemies neither show their face nor declare 
their political goals, negotiations are out of the question. In such cases, warfare is 
the only viable option, as Bush immediately made clear: ‘Our military is powerful, 
and it’s prepared’ (2001a). Unlike his fictional counterpart in Independence Day, 
Bush the former F-101 jet pilot never flew a mission against the enemy. But on 1 
May 2003 he notoriously landed in the co-pilot seat of an S-3B Viking on the air-
craft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CNN 2003). His dramatic tailhook landing, his 
emergence from the cockpit in flying gear, and his speech under the banner ‘Mis-
sion Accomplished’ were nationally televised. 
As Susan Sontag notes, even the most bellicose alien invasion film usually 
combines the ‘hunger for a “good war”’ with a ‘yearning for peace, or for at least 
peaceful coexistence’. The theme of interplanetary warfare then goes hand in hand 
with what she terms a ‘UN fantasy, a fantasy of united warfare’, in which ‘the war-
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ring nations of the earth come to their senses and suspend their own conflicts’ 
(1967: 219-20). Once again, Sontag’s analysis of 1950s B-movies reads like a de-
scription of Independence Day, albeit with one import important exception: in Em-
merich’s film, there is no need for time-consuming UN diplomacy. All nations of 
the earth quickly unite under American leadership – even Arabs and Israelis over-
come their enmity and fight side by side – prompting the American President to 
declare a world-wide Independence Day. Is ‘Operation Infinite Justice’, as it was 
initially called, not a very similar fantasy? 
 
IV 
In his review of Steven Spielberg’s War of the Worlds, British film critic Kevin 
Maher remarks that ‘there is something fundamentally paradoxical, and frankly 
odd, about Spielberg employing the very genre that he helped to establish and that 
supposedly contributed to 9/11 in an attempt to explain the meaning of 9/11 
itself’ (2005). I would make the opposite argument: whereas Spielberg’s choice of 
genre is quite consistent with public discourse on 9/11, it in no way endeavours to 
‘explain the meaning’ of the event – if by ‘meaning’ we understand its causes, con-
texts, and aims. 
The film’s release was accompanied by numerous press conferences and in-
terviews in which the director and his screenwriters emphasised their deliberate 
evocation of post-9/11 fears. On one of these occasions, before the film’s pre-
miere in Tokyo, Spielberg stated that his version of Wells’s novel intended to re-
flect America’s deep ‘unease’ following the 11 September attacks (quoted in To-
night 2005). This, he continued, was not the first time that Wells’s original story 
had been updated to speak to contemporary issues. In 1938, Orson Welles fa-
mously caused panic across the US when radio listeners mistook his dramatisation 
of The War of the Worlds for an authentic news report about an ongoing Martian 
invasion of central New Jersey and New York City (Cantril 2005). ‘The radio 
show happened just before World War Two’, Spielberg commented: ‘Everybody 
in America was nervous about Hitler and what was happening in Eastern Europe.’ 
Similarly, he added that when George Pal turned The War of the Worlds into a 
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movie, his film reflected anxieties over the Cold War. Accordingly, both Welles’s 
radio play and Pal’s film are ‘relevant because they’ve occurred at a time of history 
when there was great unease in the world’ (quoted in Tonight 2005). As Spielberg 
implies, the same also holds for his own 2005 film. 
The film’s references to the events of 11 September 2001 take two forms, 
occurring either at the level of plot or at the level of imagery. The visual refer-
ences are both more numerous and more striking. As several critics have noted, 
images that have engrained themselves in the minds of television viewers all over 
the world recur in the film, sometimes as ‘almost literal visual quotes’ (Wolff 2008: 
189; see also Gordon 2007: 260-62; Thompson 2007: 146-48.). If it was not for 
the presence of actor Tom Cruise in the frame, the shot of a wall plastered with 
home-made missing person posters could hardly be distinguished from authentic 
New York footage from the days after the attacks. Other references are more 
indirect. At the beginning of the alien attack, a panicked crowd runs away from 
the tripod’s heat-ray, bringing to mind images of New Yorkers fleeing from the 
rubble of the collapsing towers. When Spielberg’s protagonist comes home, he is 
covered in the ashes of the victims who were incinerated around him – a some-
what macabre reminder of the dust-covered people who emerged from the debris 
cloud in lower Manhattan. In a similar fashion, the shot of clothes floating from 
the sky recalls the moment after the World Trade Center had been hit, when of-
fice paper filled the air and people trapped in the upper floors fell or jumped to 
their deaths. In an earlier scene, a Boeing 747 crashes into the neighbourhood in 
which the protagonist and his two children have found refuge. The site of the 
disaster – a roofless and shattered plane amidst the rubble of destroyed houses – 
restages the smouldering ruins at Ground Zero with their twisted metal beams 
and broken slabs of concrete. 
At the story level, the film makes some important modifications to Wells’s 
original invasion scenario. In the 1898 novel, the Martians are shot to Earth in 
huge cylinders and it is in the pits caused by the impact that they begin to assem-
ble their tripods. Although the Martian fighting-machines eventually emerge from 
below the ground, the incursion is conceived as an attack from ‘above.’ The sci-
ence fiction films of the 1950s further accentuated this theme, which resonated 
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with both a growing belief in UFOs and the very real threat of enemy missiles. 
One of the earliest representatives of the genre, 1951’s The Thing from Another 
World, famously ended with a warning to the ‘world’ (both inside and outside of 
the film): ‘Tell this to everybody wherever they are: Watch the skies. Everywhere. 
Keep looking. Keep watching the skies’ (quoted in Matthews 2007: 14). 
Spielberg’s film shows signs of a different kind of paranoia. In this post-
9/11 version of Wells’s tale, the alien machines are already on Earth, ‘“sleeper” 
tripods’ waiting to be activated when the time is ripe (Thompson 2007: 147). 
When the aliens finally ‘come down’ during a lightning storm, they merely con-
tinue an invasion that might have been planned ‘for a million years’, the machines 
having been buried ‘before the first people were here’ (Friedman and Koepp 
2005: sc. 58A and sc. 188). Accordingly, one of the taglines used to advertise the 
film was ‘They’re already here.’ Designed to evoke post-9/11 fears of terrorist 
sleeper cells, this teaser signalled the advent of a new type of enemy: one who 
comes from outside, but who, in a sense, is already among us. The introduction of 
this new type of antagonist is clearly related to the fact that prior to the September 
2001 attacks, all four pilots had lived and received flight training in the US. Where 
the 1953 film linked the alien invasion to apprehensions of a Soviet ‘sneak attack’, 
Spielberg’s 2005 War of the Worlds is set in an America whose citizens live in fear-
ful expectation of the next terrorist bombing. After a tripod has risen up from 
beneath the streets of Bayonne, New Jersey, and begun to wreak havoc on the 
town, the protagonist’s eleven-year-old daughter inquires: ‘Is it the terrorists?!’ 
(Friedman and Koepp 2005: sc. 43), the definite article indicating a real-life refer-
ent. The following exchange between the protagonist, Ray, and his son Robbie 
situates the film’s action in a new global geopolitical environment: 
 
Robbie:  ... Is it terrorists? 
Ray:  No. This came from some place else. 
Robbie:  What do you mean, like, Europe? 
(Friedman and Koepp 2005: sc. 46) 
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As outrageous as the notion of giant war machines from outer space may be, the 
children’s responses suggest that the destruction of American cityscapes no longer 
belongs to the realm of filmic extravaganza: similar things have really happened. 
On 11 September 2001, television viewers all over the world had seen what au-
thentic footage from a site of disaster looked like; and it is this footage that the 
film deliberately calls to mind. To enhance this effect, Spielberg’s cinematogra-
pher repeatedly uses hand-held cameras, emulating the shaky camcorder footage 
from the scene of the 9/11 bombings. One shot shows the incineration of a vic-
tim on the LCD screen of an abandoned camcorder. 
It has been suggested that Spielberg’s film places American citizens in the 
position of the Iraqi population during the 2003 ‘shock and awe’ bombings of 
Baghdad (Friedman 2006: 159). Even if such readings are explicitly supported by 
screenwriter David Koepp (see Feld 2005: 142), the film’s primary purpose is 
clearly to re-enact a specifically American experience: the historically unprece-
dented attack against US civilians on US territory on 11 September 2001. The 
figure of the alien invader is by definition over-determined (partly due to the 
‘memory’ of the genre, which necessarily evokes earlier uses of that figure). To 
cast the aliens as both terrorists and American invaders, however, illustrates the 
dilemmas of what David Holloway characterises as ‘Hollywood allegory lite’: ‘a 
commercial aesthetic so packed with different hooks pitched at different audience 
groups that a degree of aesthetic and narrative fragmentation has become intrinsic 
to the way Hollywood tells its stories today, particularly the blockbuster’. Hollo-
way continues: 
 
In Hollywood allegory lite, controversial issues can be safely addressed be-
cause they must be ‘read off’ other stories by the viewer; while the ‘alle-
gory’ is sufficiently loose or ‘lite’, and the other attractions on offer are 
sufficiently compelling or diverse, that viewers can enjoy the film without 
needing to engage at all with the risky ‘other story’ it tells. 
(2008: 83) 
 
Summoning the image of New Yorkers ‘fleeing across the George Washington 
Bridge in the shadow of 9/11’, Spielberg himself explained that his film was 
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‘about Americans fleeing for their lives, being attacked for no reason, having no 
idea why they are being attacked and who is attacking them’ (quoted in Chau 
2005). It is notable that this explanation fails to mention either the perpetrators or 
their possible motives, echoing – and, implicitly, affirming – a particular kind of 
discourse on the attacks of 9/11: because America is literally attacked out of the 
blue (and ‘for no reason’), there is no need for reconsidering the country’s military 
and political entanglements in the Middle East. And the same is true for War of the 
Worlds, in which the causes of the invasion remain completely obscure. 
In the wake of 9/11, the question arose as to whether the perceived simi-
larities between the scenes of that day and Hollywood imagery were perhaps not 
accidental. Five weeks after the incident, veteran director Robert Altman exhorted 
his fellow filmmakers to reconsider their routine indulgence in violence and mass 
destruction. Drawing a direct connection between the attacks and American 
blockbusters, Altman asserted that the latter had clearly served as a template and 
inspiration for the former: ‘Nobody would have thought to commit an atrocity 
like that unless they’d seen it in a movie. [...] The movies set the pattern, and these 
people have copied the movies’ (quoted in BBC 2001c). Film critic Richard von 
Busack even went so far as to speculate about a possible paradigm shift in Holly-
wood: ‘Maybe the attack will knock an entire moviemaking style out of existence. 
It would be no loss: action movies are decadent and baroque now, in need of 
some clever new approach’ (Busack 2001). 
As we know today, the expectation that Hollywood film would undergo a 
radical change was to be short-lived. Like several other prognostications made in 
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, it over-estimated the cultural 
impact of the event. There was a brief period in which releases were postponed 
on thematic grounds – Arnold Schwarzenegger’s skirmish with Colombian terror-
ists in Collateral Damage providing the most famous example – and in which re-
shoots and re-edits were made for New York-set films showing the Twin Towers, 
such as Men in Black II (Hoberman 2001), but it only took four years for the alien 
invader to return to the cinema screen. And, what is more, it was a film of this 
very genre that was marketed and received as ‘the first genuine post-9/11 block-
buster’ (Maher 2005). In some ways, Spielberg’s film marked a return to business 
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as usual. Far from renouncing the representation of disaster, as some critics had 
prophesied, Hollywood did what it had always done: it adapted popular genres to 
the needs of the moment. Thus, War of the Worlds showed computer-generated 
scenes of urban devastation, even if it purposely avoided the ‘destruction of fa-
mous landmarks’. According to co-writer David Koepp, this was one of the things 
he and director Steven Spielberg felt they ‘shouldn’t have in the movie’; it was also 
agreed that the film would not feature any ‘shots of Manhattan getting the crap 
kicked out of it’.2 
Although it relocates the disaster to suburban New Jersey, however, Spiel-
berg’s film still makes ample use of 9/11 imagery. As Holloway observes, ‘the 
extent to which it force[s] audiences to re-experience 9/11 empathetically through 
encounters with that imagery, ma[kes] it much harder to concentrate on other 
aspects of the film’ (2008: 92). At the same time – and more problematically – 
War of the Worlds echoes the political construction of America’s new enemy within 
the generic code of alien invasion. In doing so, it does not bluntly equate aliens 
and terrorists; yet it nevertheless presupposes that the experience of 9/11 can be 
evoked by means of the space invader metaphor. While the film may be said to 
critique certain aspects of post-9/11 counterterrorism policies by emphasising the 
futility of military intervention, its critical stance is undercut by the fact that it 
reproduces one basic premise of official counterterrorism discourse: the radical 
othering of the enemy. This othering is based on a refusal to look beyond the 
‘alienness’ of terrorists at the complicated connections that tie ‘us’ to ‘them’ and 
that make the post-9/11 present part of a longer history – a history, it should be 
noted, that happens outside of movie theatres. 
 
 
1RWHV

1 In the online version of his essay, which appeared only four days after the attacks, Žižek read 
pre-9/11 disaster films in terms of an imaginary anticipation – and libidinal investment – of Amer-
ica’s forced awakening to the ‘desert of the Real’. His main argument (which was much elaborated 
for the now better-known printed version of the essay) was that the movie-like images of 9/11 had 
penetrated and shattered a First-World conception of reality based on the system of ‘VIRTUAL 
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
capitalism’ (epitomised by the Twin Towers), a system which had thought itself insulated from the 
Third-World ‘sphere of material production’ (2001). Baudrillard, for his part, considered disaster 
movies as an indication that the catastrophe had been secretly wished for, ‘because no one can 
avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree’ (2003: 
5). 
2 See ‘Production Notes: War of the Worlds’, 2005, 
www.waroftheworld.com/productionnotes/index.html.
